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Corporate Governance Beyond Economics
Elizabeth Pollman*

Forthcoming in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 2019)
INTRODUCTION
U.S. corporate law has an origin story. At the founding of our nation, and through the early
nineteenth century, corporations served a quasi-public function. States granted charters to private
property holders to fulfill a “public purpose” such as to provide infrastructure or local services such
as transportation, banking, and insurance.1 Profit and its distribution, while part of the expectations
of early business corporation organizers, only became a meaningful part of categorizing corporate
identity in the latter half of the nineteenth century.2 Change occurred rapidly in both business and
the law and by the century’s end, state corporate law, as we know it today, had started to take shape.
The quasi-public origin story of corporate law set the foundation for a debate about
corporate purpose that has endured for decades, finding its way into legal opinions and serving as
the subject for weighty academic discussions. Part of the classic canon of this debate is Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means’ description of the twentieth-century public corporation involving a separation
between ownership and control.3 Their vision of a society dominated by management-controlled
large corporations, with dispersed “owners of passive property,”4 provided a paradigmatic view of
the business corporation.5 Their observations, moreover, raised the question of corporate
accountability—both because of a potential conflict between those who own stock in the
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1
J.W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1970, at 15-17 (1970); see also Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business 28 (1977); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of
Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 954-85 (2014).
Notably, what constituted the public good was fiercely contested at the time. Eric Hilt, Early
American Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37, 38 (Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (“[E]arly American politics was riven by debates over
business corporations, and what exactly constituted the ‘common interest.’ ”).
2
Jonathan Levy, From Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit Corporation, in
CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 213, 217 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak,
eds., 2017); James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34
EMORY L.J. 617, 635-36 (1985).
3
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
4
Id. at 356.
5
See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121
(2011).
1
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corporation and those who manage it, and because of a concern about whether the public interest
would be served by corporations dominating the American economy.
Throughout the twentieth century, corporate law developed with a focus on the allocation of
power between shareholders and managers, and the model of the Berle and Means corporation
largely persisted. The question of corporate purpose also remained a topic of perennial debate.6
Case law reflects times in which the ultimate purpose of business corporations has been tested—
ranging, for example, from when Delaware courts developed doctrine for dealing with defensive
measures taken by target boards in the takeover context, to the modern redux of the Ford Motor
Company case involving directors pursuing goals other than shareholder value.7 Courts navigated
problems such as these with flexible and highly contextual judge-made standards. Notwithstanding
significant ambiguity and meaningful dissent,8 the dominant viewpoint that has emerged and
remained relatively stable over decades is one of understanding corporate purpose and the corporate
law framework in predominantly economic terms, and more specifically as focused on shareholder
value.9
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, evidence of a changing corporate contract could
move discourse beyond the classic corporate law canon. This change has come about with a
demographic shift among shareholders in public corporations and the rise of institutional
shareholders and shareholder activism, topics that have been extensively examined in recent
literature.10 Furthermore, this chapter explores the idea that we are also in an age of increased
6

Notable early works include the Berle-Dodd debate: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers
In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). For a discussion of the Berle-Dodd debate, see William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). More recent works in the corporate purpose literature include,
among others: Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39
J. CORP. L. 713 (2014).
7
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
8
See, e.g., William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894 (1997); Christopher
M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008); KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 127 (2006); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC (2012).
9
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439
(2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012); Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574 (2003).
10
See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1828 n.27 (2011); Myron T. Steele, Lecture: Continuity and Change in Delaware
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 352 (2015); Paul H. Edelman, Randall S.
2
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pressure on corporate law to serve as a mechanism for ordering or pursuing activity that has
importance beyond its economic value.
Both state and federal law changes have added to this dynamic. On the federal front, recent
U.S. Supreme Court cases have put existing corporate law in a new quasi-constitutional light. In the
landmark decisions of Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme
Court has pointed to state corporate law as the means by which corporations determine their
political and religious activity and resolve internal disputes.11 These decisions rely on a view of
business corporations that are, in many ways, at odds with longstanding notions from corporate law.
In addition, Congress, the SEC, and federal courts have been embroiled in battles about the scope
and appropriateness of regulating corporate speech and disclosures on topics such as conflict
minerals and political expenditures that are driven principally by humanitarian and democratic goals
rather than economic ones. On the state law front, a movement of social entrepreneurs has
catalyzed a majority of states to adopt legislation for a new form of business entity—the benefit
corporation. The public push for this form of corporate entity harkens back to early American law,
permitting businesses to be chartered to pursue a “dual mission” of profits and a social, religious, or
environmental goal.12 The spread of benefit corporation legislation has occurred concurrently but
separately from the new federalizing force on corporate law—widening the potential impact of these
developments.
We are in the early stages of understanding the significance of these developments, but they
hold the potential to dramatically change the corporate landscape, just as the splintering of business
corporations from nonprofits did in the nineteenth century. The chapter proceeds by examining
these developments and their implications, and anticipates future challenges on the horizon.
RECENT FEDERAL AND STATE DEVELOPMENTS THAT INCREASE THE ROLE OF CORPORATE
LAW IN ORDERING NON-ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Business corporations have always been embedded in society and have always involved
natural persons who have a full range of interests and values—economic, social, political, religious—
that may motivate their actions. Further, some significant corporate governance regulations, which

Thomas, & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1359, 1387-92 (2014); INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE
EQUITY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION (William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299 (2008);
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1021 (2007).
11
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. _, 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
12
See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U.
L. REV. 269 (2013).
3
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have been in place for decades, implicate this range of motivations and concerns, such as proxy
regulation and the shareholder proposal rule, SEC Rule 14a-8.13
Notwithstanding this general recognition that business corporations may have both
economic and social aspects to their nature,14 until recently federal regulation of corporate and
securities law has focused predominantly on investor protection and the economic interests at
stake.15 And much of the corporate law literature and debate has continued to mine the classic
questions of the nineteenth century regarding in whose interests the corporation should be run or
has accepted an economic lens through which to theorize and analyze corporate law, treating
corporations as economic entities designed to maximize value for their equity investors.16
Two significant developments have taken place in the past several years that have added
complexity to this picture. First, a new federal influence on corporate governance has emerged that
has increasingly placed into the spotlight the role of social, political, and religious values in business
corporations. Second, the birth of benefit corporations has made visible the choice of some
corporate organizers and investors to participate in a different type of corporate contract that
expressly requires pursuing values beyond shareholder wealth. This section discusses each
development in turn.
First Amendment Battles of Corporations and The Federalizing of Corporate Governance
Over the past forty years, with little exception to the trend, courts have been expanding the
First Amendment rights of corporations.17 This trend has been in bold contrast to the pervasive
regulation of corporate and commercial speech throughout U.S. legal history and leading up to this
point.18 The recognition of corporate speech rights started with a focus on nonprofit and media
13

See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 93-95
(1995) (discussing the political nature of proxy speech and proxy regulation); Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999)
(arguing that the SEC can and should require social and financial disclosure by public companies to
promote corporate social transparency).
14
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261
(1992).
15
For example, the substantive corporate governance mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
included provisions that require independent audit committees, executive certifications of financial
statements, and restrictions on purchasing nonauditing services from the corporation’s auditors and
a prohibition on corporate loans to officers. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
16
See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW
TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
17
CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN?: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SEPARATION OF
CORPORATION AND STATE 6 (2016); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment:
History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015).
18
Coates, supra note 17, at 223; Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 140.
4
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corporations, but over time those decisions have been used as the foundation for recognizing the
rights of business corporations more generally.19 According to one recent study, “[n]early half of
First Amendment legal challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups, rather than
other kinds of organizations or individuals.”20
Two recent landmark decisions on the political spending rights and the statutory religious
liberty rights of business corporations have significantly contributed to this trend: Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby. These decisions, and other battles at the federal level about the political, religious, and
social roles of corporations, have increased expectations that internal corporate governance will
reconcile these changing rights and responsibilities. Business and constitutional law have thus
intersected in ways that raise new issues for the future of corporate law.
In the 2010 case of Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a
significant campaign finance restriction and precedent that distinguished between the political
speech of individuals and corporations.21 The petitioner in the case, Citizens United, would have fit
within an exception to the campaign finance prohibition at issue given its status as a nonprofit
political advocacy corporation, however it had funded the electioneering communication in question
with a small portion of funds from for-profit business corporations.22 Instead of ruling narrowly as
to the corporation before the Court, it instead ruled broadly as to all corporations, freeing them to
spend unlimited general treasury funds on independent political expenditures.
The Court based its ruling on the listeners’ interest in hearing speech as well as on a
characterization of corporations as “associations of citizens” and an implication that the First
Amendment protection of corporations is equal to that of individuals.23 The Court did not
distinguish between various types of corporations in its reasoning and instead suggested an
expressive or dignitary value in corporate speech.24 Further, when rejecting an argument that the
government had a compelling interest to regulate the political spending of business corporations in
order to protect dissenting shareholders, the Court failed to look closely at the questions of whose
voice is expressed through business corporations and what options exist for dissenting shareholders.
The Court assumed that corporate law provided sufficient rules for ordering decisions about
political spending and that expenditures would be transparent, as technology has enabled timely

19

Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015).
20
Coates, supra note 17, at 224.
21
558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). Specifically, the Court struck down a provision of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act that prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make
expenditures for electioneering communications within a certain period of a federal election and it
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
22
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 327-29; see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986).
23
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354.
24
See id. at 340-41 (“By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government
deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth,
standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”).
5
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disclosure.25 Thus, according to the Court, “[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”26
While to some Citizens United represented an incremental loosening of restrictions on
corporate political spending that had already begun in the 1970s,27 others saw this as a dramatic
move empowering business corporations to take on a new political role. Not all companies engaged
in politics or cheered the Citizens United decision, but it provided many corporations and donors with
what one campaign finance lawyer described as a “psychological green light” and “torrents of
money, much of it anonymous” started flowing into electoral races.28 The case became a cultural
lightening rod as President Obama criticized it in his 2010 State of the Union address for having
“reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in
our elections,” to which Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito mouthed in response, “It’s not true.”29
Grassroots organizations sprung up to fight for a constitutional amendment overturning Citizens
United.30 Stories about the distorting impact of corporate political money, particularly in local
elections, have continued to garner public attention.31
The additional latitude that Citizens United provided for business corporations to make
political expenditures, and its reasoning based on the “procedures of corporate democracy,” brought
25

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making
profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed
interests.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Id. at 361-62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
27
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765; Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
217, 217 (2010) (arguing “that although the decision was a bold stroke in many ways, its impact on
the scope of permissible campaign finance regulation is far less substantial than commonly
assumed”).
28
Michael Luo, Money Talks Louder Than Ever in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/us/politics/08donate.html?pagewanted=all.
Notably, a
significant portion of post-Citizens United expenditures have come from wealthy individuals. See
Matea Gold & Anu Narayanswamy, The New Gilded Age: Close to Half of All Super-PAC Money Comes
From 50 Donors, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-newgilded-age-close-to-half-of-all-super-pac-money-comes-from-50-donors/2016/04/15/63dc363c01b4-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.6c840f9bbfb7; Nicholas Confessore et al.,
The Families Funding the 2016 Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-superpac-donors.html.
29
Adam Winkler, Alito Was Rude (But Right), HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/alito-was-rude-but-right_b_440207.html.
30
See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights after Citizens United: An Analysis of the
Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011).
31
See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Why Is Chevron Spending Millions on a Municipal Election?, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/why-chevronspending-millions-municipal-election.
6
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the fire and heat of the public controversy surrounding this decision into the realm of corporate
governance. As Professor Larry Ribstein observed, “Citizens United shifted the debate over
corporate speech from corporations’ power to distort political debate to the corporate governance
processes that authorize this speech.”32
The second recent blockbuster case adding to this federal overlay on corporate law is Hobby
Lobby. The case arose out of challenges by three closely held corporations to a provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 requiring employers to offer health insurance
meeting certain minimum coverage standards, which the Department of Health and Human Services
defined to include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods.33 Families who were unanimous in
their religious beliefs against certain contraception owned the stock of the three corporations in the
case and argued that the Department of Health regulations violated the religious liberty rights of
these corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Act prohibits the
“Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability” unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means
of serving a compelling governmental interest.34
The Court held that business corporations are “persons” capable of the “exercise of
religion” within the meaning of RFRA and that the Department of Health regulations violated
RFRA as applied to these closely held corporations. The Court reasoned that extending RFRA
protection to the corporations “protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control
these companies.”35
In so reasoning, the Court alluded to corporate law as the mechanism for establishing the
religious identity of a business corporation. The Court’s language seemed to rely on a notion of
shareholder agreement in a closely held corporation, but left unspecified the precise qualifications
for RFRA protection. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that “the owners of a company might
well have a dispute relating to religion,” but disposed of this concern by noting that “[s]tate
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a
corporation can establish its governing structure.”36
With Citizens United’s reference to the “procedures of corporate democracy” and Hobby
Lobby’s reference to the “ready means” of state corporate law, the Court both expanded the political
and religious rights of corporations and leaned on corporate law to provide the rules for
corporations to determine whether and how to exercise such rights.37
32

Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1021
(2011).
33
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
34
42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a), (b)(2012). In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability.’” 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). RFRA is a legislative response
to Smith, with a stated purpose to “restore the compelling interest test” as set forth in pre-Smith case
law. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1).
35
134 S. Ct. at 2768.
36
Id. at 2775.
37
Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016).
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Other battles at the federal level have also added to the growing focus on the political and
social role of corporations. For example, Congress included provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 that used corporate disclosure as a tool for
broader humanitarian or social goals. The conflict minerals provision, section 1502 of Dodd-Frank,
required public companies to investigate their supply chains, disclose the origins of certain minerals
used in their products, and to include a description of products not found to be “conflict-free.”
Congress explained the provision was aiming at helping to solve “an emergency and humanitarian
situation” in the Democratic Republic of Congo where “the exploitation and trade of conflict
minerals . . . is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence . . . particularly
sexual- and gender-based violence. . .”38 Shortly after the SEC implemented the law, three trade
associations challenged it as unconstitutional compelled speech. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
trade associations, holding that whether the minerals were “conflicted” was a value judgment that
the government could not force corporations to render under the First Amendment.39
Putting aside whether one views the conflict minerals rule as inappropriate overstepping by
Congress or rather as an appropriate use of disclosure in the public interest, and whether rules such
as these may have a short life expectancy in politically turbulent times, the point here is to observe
that recent battles have added to the perception that there has been a “corporate takeover of the
First Amendment.”40 As one observer explained: “Whether it is the corporate challenge to the
Seattle minimum wage law where corporations were making a corporate equal protection argument
or whether it is GMO labeling in Vermont . . . , corporate actors are using the First Amendment as a
sword to fight democratic oversight of their conduct.”41 These battles increase the task of corporate
law to order activity that is not only economic in nature and reduce the ability of government to
regulate corporations as it has in the past.
The Birth of Benefit Corporations
In addition to – and arguably in tension with – these federal developments, a separate
movement has arisen, reflecting the view that existing state corporate law is inadequate for
businesses pursuing a social good besides shareholder wealth maximization. In 2010, the same year
that the Supreme Court handed down Citizens United, Maryland became the first state in the United
States to adopt a benefit corporation statute establishing a new form of business corporation in
which the directors must consider the interests of all stakeholders and pursue a public benefit in

38

Dodd–Frank § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 2213.
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800
F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e continue to agree with NAM that [r]equiring a company to
publicly condemn itself is undoubtedly a more effective way for the government to stigmatize and
shape behavior than for the government to have to convey its views itself, but that makes the
requirement more constitutionally offensive, not less so.”) (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted).
40
Coates, supra note 17.
41
TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 17, at 76-77 (quoting Interview with Elizabeth Kennedy, Counsel,
Demos (Aug. 12, 2015)).
39
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addition to profits.42 Over thirty states, including Delaware, currently have benefit corporation
statutes.43 Although the numbers are still modest, several thousand businesses have used these
statutes, hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital has been invested in benefit corporations,
and several public corporations have subsidiaries that are benefit corporations.44
The catalyst for the benefit corporation movement is B Lab, a non-profit started by social
entrepreneurs with the belief that traditional corporate law does not provide a governance model
that is fully consistent with operating business in a sustainable manner in the interests of all
stakeholders. While some commentators have argued that a different form of corporation was
unnecessary because traditional “C” corporations could be customized and corporate law gives
directors discretion to consider stakeholder interests, particularly in states with constituency
statutes,45 the B Lab founders believed that it was necessary to create a new form of entity in order
to lock into a company’s DNA “mission-aligned governance” and to credibly prove to stakeholders
that it was a firm commitment.46
The key concepts of benefit corporation legislation include the requirements that the
corporate charter must contain a clearly articulated public or social purpose, the directors must
consider stakeholder interests beyond shareholder profit, and the company must report on its efforts
to promote its purpose. Many states have adopted benefit corporation statutes based on the B Lab
model legislation, but some variation exists, for example with regard to the pursuit of a public or
social benefit. Some states require the pursuit of a “general public benefit,” which is defined as “a
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole,” whereas others leave it
to the corporation to define its mission, and still others require or allow the corporation to identify a

42

Frederick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit Corporations, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (July 5,
2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/07/05_alexander.html;
Brett
McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields (or the Existential Failing of Delaware), 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute.
That is, benefit corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different or additional
rules.”).
43
Alexander, supra note 42; State by State Status of Legislation, B LAB, available at
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
44
Alexander, supra note 42; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 253 (2014); see also Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and
Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (arguing that using LLC uptake as a comparative
historical benchmark suggests “that there is hope that these new social enterprise corporations will
see an increasing rate of uptake in the future”).
45
See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 405-06 (2013) (“Delaware’s new benefit corporation law laudably
advances the goal of institutional pluralism, but does so at the ironic risk of reinforcing a belief that
business corporations themselves are legally permitted only to maximize profits.”).
46
Alexander, supra note 42; Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1036 (2013).
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“specific social benefit.”47 Delaware, for example, defines “public benefit” to mean “a positive
effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more categories . . . including, but not limited to,
effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical,
religious, scientific, or technological nature.”48
Notwithstanding this variation, all benefit corporation statutes do not just allow the pursuit
of social goals other than profit maximization, but in fact require them to do so and this requirement
is backed up by certain accountability and transparency mechanisms.49 The ultimate goal of this
movement appears to extend not only to spreading the benefit corporation form but also the ideals
it embodies, of pursuing goals beyond economic value to shareholders, and the hope this will be
embraced by business more broadly.50
RESPONSES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The above discussion argues that the expanded federal rights of corporations and the birth
of benefit corporations puts new pressure on corporate law to serve as an ordering mechanism for
interests and values beyond economics. Because the federal developments are not cabined within
the benefit corporation movement, we have a broader push towards a reshaping of rights and roles
of corporations.
This section examines some of the issues these developments have posed and identifies
potential controversies that may still lie ahead. In particular, the below discussion considers the
possibility that reform that is responsive to the changing rights and roles of business corporations
will be slow and difficult to achieve, and the history of corporate rights suggests that corporations
will likely push for further expansions of rights.
Revising the Corporate Contract
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby raised a host of important questions in their wake. Should
the same corporate law rules apply for issues concerning economic and non-economic values? What
must a corporation do to be recognized as having a social or religious identity? Are changes to
voting rules in order such as super-majority protections or other means of protecting dissenting
shareholders in a new age of corporate activity? Should non-shareholder participants in the
corporation have a greater voice in governance?
Despite this substantial list of questions and an abundance of attempts at reform, the years
immediately following Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have produced relatively little change to
corporate law or governance. The struggles to bring about real transformation in response to these
landmark decisions have illuminated the political infeasibility and practical difficulty of broad-based
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corporate change and the fact that consensus is lacking about how to even understand existing
corporate law.
One of the pressing issues post-Citizens United has been whether federal legislation, changes
to state corporate law, or private ordering of corporations might bring governance in line with the
“corporate democracy” and transparency to shareholders that the opinion had invoked in its
reasoning. Although public disapproval of Citizens United was high,51 reform efforts stalled in
Congress. For example, a proposal by several U.S. senators to amend the Constitution failed as did
multiple attempts at passing the Shareholder Protection Act, which would have required public
companies to disclose and obtain shareholder approval of corporate political spending and to have
board oversight of such spending.52 A few states succeeded in adopting modest measures that
require corporations to get board approval of corporate political expenditures,53 but many more
states considered bills requiring disclosure or shareholder approval of corporate political spending
that have failed to become law.54
In addition, attempts to spur the SEC to mandate public companies to disclose political
expenditures have so far failed. Record-breaking support for a SEC mandate has continued to grow,
with a petition for public company political spending disclosure amassing more than a million public
comments, including the support of many institutional investors and politicians.55 However, under
significant political pressure, then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White removed the request for rulemaking
from the agency’s agenda in 2013 and Congress buried a policy rider in the omnibus budget
agreement that prevented the SEC from using fiscal year 2016 funds to finalize a rule on the topic.56
Whether one agrees or disagrees on the merits with this result, it is notable that Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion in Citizens United, has expressed concern that corporate
disclosure of political spending is “not working the way it should.”57
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Meanwhile, shareholders have endeavored to get political spending and disclosure rules
through firm-by-firm private ordering and have had some limited and spotty success. Shareholder
proposals on corporate political spending and disclosure increased significantly after Citizens
United—hundreds of such proposals have been introduced in the past several years and a small
handful have received majority shareholder support over board opposition.58 Shareholder proposals
are often negotiated behind the scenes, however, and thus much of what is known about public
companies’ political expenditures comes from voluntary disclosures or disclosures pursuant to
privately-negotiated agreements.59 These private mechanisms have therefore brought about some
increase in corporate political spending disclosure, but the broader picture remains that there have
been no substantive changes to “the procedures of corporate democracy” that the Supreme Court
blindly relied upon in Citizens United. Furthermore, shareholder proposals typically fail or proceed
through opaque processes and the information available to shareholders (and citizens) regarding
corporate political spending remains incomplete.
Whereas the aftermath of Citizens United reflects the political infeasibility and practical
difficulty of broad-based corporate change, the aftermath of Hobby Lobby reveals that consensus is
lacking about how to even understand existing corporate law. After the Court handed down Hobby
Lobby, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health
and Human Services, published a proposed rule seeking comments on defining which for-profit
corporations are eligible to claim religious exemptions under the decision. The Court itself had
pointed to the term “closely held corporation” and state corporate law to provide guidance about
how corporations may choose a religious identity. Comments flowed in revealing that corporate law
experts disagreed about how to best interpret the Court’s language and reconcile it with state
corporate law—belying the Court’s claim that state corporate law provides a “ready means” for
resolving disputes that may arise regarding which corporations have a religious identity.60 For
purposes of implementing the Hobby Lobby decision as to corporations claiming a religious
accommodation, the Departments issued a final rule that defined eligible closely held corporations.61
Subsequent courts have begun to grapple with whether and how to apply Hobby Lobby’s ruling and

58

Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J.
262, 294 n.122 (2016).
59
Id. at 262, 264-66.
60
See Lyman Johnson et al., Comments on the HHS’ Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules (UCLA
School of Law Research Paper No. 14-18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512860; Robert P.
Bartlett III et al., Comment on the Definition of “Eligible Organization” (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507305 (authored by U.C. Berkeley Corporate Law Professors);
Katherine Franke et al., Comment on the Definition of “Eligible Organization” (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gendersexuality/prpcp_comments_on_proposed_regs_corp_law_profs_for_submission.pdf (authored by
the Columbia Conscience Project and Corporate Law Professors).
61
Administration Issues Final Rules on Coverage of Certain Recommended Preventive Services Without Cost
Sharing, HHS.GOV (July 10, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/07/10/administrationissues-final-rules-on-coverage-of-certain-recommended-preventive-services-without-costsharing.html.
12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042325

Draft (12/2017)
reasoning in different contexts beyond allowing business corporations to opt out of the
contraception requirements under the Affordable Care Act.62
In sum, efforts to respond to Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have been limited in their
effect. The Supreme Court can move relatively quickly in recasting corporate roles and rights, but
responsive legislative change and private ordering are often difficult to achieve and narrower or
piecemeal in scope. One of the boldest changes in corporate law in recent years has been the
benefit corporation movement itself—yet it provides the choice of a separate corporate form rather
than clarifying the purpose of traditional corporations or moving them towards greater transparency
or improved governance.63 Significant issues remain to be worked out in coming years in reconciling
the increased social, political, and religious activity of business corporations.
Controversies on the Horizon
As state and federal law reshapes the rights and roles of business corporations, new
controversies come into closer view. The continued expansion of the constitutional and statutory
rights of business corporations, as we saw in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, portends potential
future challenges concerning speech and association.
First, the expanded political speech rights of corporations call into question the boundaries
with other areas such as commercial speech and the applicability of concerns about compelled
speech with regard to business corporations. Although the Supreme Court has recognized a limited
measure of protection for commercial speech since 1976 on the basis of the rights of listeners to be
informed,64 the Court and lower federal courts may have already lost sight of this limited basis for
protection.
The recent D.C. Circuit conflict minerals disclosure case, discussed above, illustrates this
point. There, the court found a First Amendment right against compelled speech by assuming that a
value exists in protecting the autonomy of corporate speakers rather than recognizing that
commercial speech is only constitutionally valuable to the extent that it provides factual information
to an audience.65 As Robert Post has explained, “Regulations that force a speaker to disgorge more
information to an audience do not contradict the constitutional purpose of commercial speech
doctrine. They may even enhance it.”66 Notably, the conflict minerals case is not an outlier—there
are a growing number of circuit court decisions that have used the doctrine of “compelled
62
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commercial speech” to strike down laws mandating commercial disclosures.67 With changing views
of corporations and the values they pursue, courts could increasingly see commercial speakers as
having autonomy interests to protect.
Furthermore, in a 2011 case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court applied
“heightened” scrutiny to a commercial regulation, striking down a Vermont law that prohibited the
sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal individual doctors’ prescribing practices.68
The majority opinion noted that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception” to the principle that “[t]he
First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”69 Justice Breyer understood the
majority’s ruling as a troubling turn and warned in his dissent: “At best the Court opens a Pandora’s
Box of First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally
affect a commercial message. At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting
judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”70
This line of cases may presage future First Amendment challenges to securities regulation
and other longstanding pillars of corporate regulation. Scholars foretold this possibility decades
ago,71 and the law has moved closer in this direction. In a 2015 case, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the
Supreme Court cited Sorrell for the expansive proposition that “Government regulation of speech is
content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.”72 As Supreme Court commentator Adam Liptak wryly observed: “Securities
regulation is a topic.”73 Indeed, taken literally or to its logical conclusion, the Supreme Court’s
language suggests a view of all mandatory commercial disclosures as content-based restrictions that
would be subject to searching constitutional review.74
Another area that is ripe for new controversy in light of recent corporate developments is
the Supreme Court’s freedom of association doctrine, which has long recognized that expressive
associations may claim institutional autonomy with respect to membership and internal
governance.75 Although an explicit dichotomy has not been drawn, commercial associations have
67
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been understood in the past as entitled only to minimal constitutional protection from regulation.76
Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, once explained: “The robust First Amendment freedom to
associate belongs only to groups ‘engage[d] in ‘expressive association . . .’ The Campbell Soup
Company does not exist to promote a message, and ‘there is only minimal constitutional protection
of the freedom of commercial association.’”77
Will this distinction hold in coming years? Justice Scalia referred to Campbell Soup
Company simply as shorthand for what he seemed to take as a basic understanding that ordinary
commercial associations are not formed to engage in First Amendment activities. But recent times
have seen the developments discussed in this chapter, and we can observe that even Campbell Soup,
for example, has acquired Plum Organics, a benefit corporation that “was founded by a group of
parents on a mission to give the very best food to our little ones.”78
Scholars have long criticized the distinction between expressive and commercial associations,
arguing that it is unprincipled or that at least some commercial businesses deserve the same level of
constitutional protection as expressive associations.79 Their arguments are strengthened by the
developments discussed in this chapter pushing corporate governance toward focusing on noneconomic values and the increasingly politicized consumer and investor markets. Benefit
corporations have explicit social, religious, and environmental missions. Corporations are
increasingly taking political and religious stances in the marketplace—from small businesses claiming
religious liberty protections to discriminate in providing their services to major corporations pushing
back against state religious liberty and anti-LGBTQ+ laws. Indeed, as of this writing, a case raising
issues about state anti-discrimination law and the First Amendment is pending before the Supreme
Court.80
As these trends continue, categorizing corporate activity may prove difficult. Professor
Ronald Colombo posed the question: “Consider decisions to grant or deny employee benefits to
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.”); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (“An association must merely
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”).
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unmarried domestic partners, or to purchase parts and supplies from foreign companies known to
violate domestic standards regarding child labor. Could not these choices, however they are made,
be deemed to some ‘socially responsible,’ to others ‘political,’ and to still others ‘strictly business’”?81
Yet, a great deal is at stake in these coming controversies. If courts “ignore[] the reality that
nonhuman corporations are fundamentally distinct from their ultimate human investors,”82 the
rights of business corporations will expand and the sphere in which government can act will narrow.
Indeed, “[i]f there were a First Amendment right to associate to form ordinary commercial
corporations, . . . every aspect of state corporate law would be subject to strict First Amendment
scrutiny.”83 Paradoxically, while some corporations echo earlier times in American history when
corporations were understood as pursuing private and public values, states and the federal
government may have a smaller sphere in which they can regulate corporations than ever before.
CONCLUSION
Corporate governance, the “corporation’s operating system,” is complex and subject to
continual change.84 This chapter gathers some of the threads of recent legal change at the federal
and state levels that challenge a view of corporate law as simply ordering the private economic
interests and relations of shareholders and managers.
In the federal courts, First Amendment battles have increasingly placed into the spotlight the
role of social, political, and religious values in business corporations. In particular, the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby put weight on state corporate law to provide
decision-making rules for corporate political spending and religious identity. Other federal court
decisions also suggest further controversy ahead with respect to corporate commercial speech and
freedom of association. In a separate development, a social entrepreneurship movement has spread
across the states, establishing the benefit corporation as a new form of business entity that expressly
requires the pursuit of both profits and another purpose in the social, religious, or environmental
realm.
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A difficult question at the heart of these developments is whether there is, or could ever be,
a clear and meaningful distinction between the economic and the non-economic aspects of the
business corporation or if that distinction will always be hard to draw or even illusory. But
regardless of whether one sees these developments as increasing the role of business corporations
and corporate law in ordering activity that is fundamentally non-economic in nature or rather that
simply has dimensions beyond the economic, these are important trends to pull together and
examine.
As this chapter points out, understanding business corporations as institutions embedded in
society, as sites of both public and private values, is not new but rather deeply rooted in history. But
what is new is a willingness to translate this understanding into expansions of rights for business
corporations. Courts have allowed the logic of earlier decisions that set limits on the rights of
corporations to fade and have embraced previously eschewed notions of autonomy and dignity
interests in business corporations. There is a Pandora’s Box-like quality to this jurisprudence, as
Justice Breyer observed, as it may open the door to future challenges and lines of reasoning that
prove harmful. Together with the arrival of benefit corporations, these developments suggest that
participants in business corporations face a changing corporate contract and will need to do more
work to decide how they should operate, what activities they should engage in, and what differences
in purposes and rights these varied business corporations will have.
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